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1. Introduction:
Lehman Brothers, one of the largest investment banks, declared bankruptcy on September 15 of 2008. It was
so significant in scale, breadth and severity that most observers considered it the worst, so that it is now popular 
called the Subprime Crisis. Though the problem originated in subprime loan for which low income bracket 
enjoy the benefits of having their own houses, the bank allowed investors to invest heavily in their projects. 
The subprime crisis may not connect directly to risk incentive problem we are now discussing but serve as a
warning to the people who are involved in investment.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that managers acting on behalf of equity holders have an incentive to
overinvest in risky and possibly negative net present value projects in order to transfer wealth from bond
holders to equity holders. In particular, obvious symptoms of the problem are exhibited in a situation when the
shareholders behavior cannot be perceived by the bond holders. Among other research work, Smith and Warner
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Abstract
A typical problem in financial contracting is the so-called risk-shifting problem, which has been studied in economics and
finance. This problem, which usually arises in the context of a lender-
incentive to give influence to the risk of his project.
negotiation when it is possible, as a result inefficiencies in resource allocation will develop. There are several ways to cope
with the risk incentive problems. We attempt to show several alternatives to mitigate the problems. Our model is based on 
option theory for which the analyses may be different from others in the literature.
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(1979), Kalay (1982), Green (2001), Gertner and Scharfstein (1991), Chiesa (1992), Isagawa (2006) and 
Miyake and Inoue(2009,2012) are found. 
  
assets when the borrower is a levered firm or has unhealthy assets. We discuss risk incentive problems brought 
by borrowers and then after referr
summarize several ways to mitigate the risk incentive problems including debt concession. Since the seminal 
work of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973), the option pricing framework has been applied to 
valuing various claims written on the value of the firm. We use the same framework to analyze the risk 
parties are discussed. Our approach to analyze is based on option pricing theory, which is quite different from 
the way by Isagawa (2006) and others. 
2. Structure of Contract 
We consider a financial intermediary (a lender) and a firm (a borrower) that reach the following agreement. 
At time t, a financial contract between a lender and a borrower is determined. Here, the lender as a financial 
intermediary lends money D to the borrower in exchange for a promise by the borrower to pay him 
)( tTrdDeD  at loan maturity time T, where rd is the interest rate. 
At time 1, the borrower invests the money, selecting an asset among many possible N investment projects. 
These projects are mutually exclusive. Moreover, assume at the initial time the values of all assets are 
equivalent with different risk )...1( Nii  for all assets. In order for the option pricing theory to be applied 
with the validity for our argument, it is often assumed that each project value follows a stochastic process 
because of the efficient market hypothesis. Thus, a project whose value dynamics Si are given as a geometric 
Brownian motion,  
),1( NidWSdrSdS iiii   (1) 
where r is the risk-free rate and dW  denotes Wiener process. To examine the influence of the risk-shifting 
incentive, we assume that options described here have the same maturity time T and that the final return S ( , T) 
can be observed by both the lender and the borrower at time T. If the value of the asset drops to around the 
default barrier L, then the lender will perceive the situation so that the project is immediately suspended and the 
contract between the both parties is terminated. At that time, the possible loan collected by the lender is 
reduced to L and the payoff by the borrower is zero. This implies that limitation provision is contained in the 
financial contract (Chacko et al (2006)). In other words, the default barrier L allows that the lender may drive 
the borrower to the default under some situation even though the borrowing firm would not reveal the failure to 
pay his financial debt. 
At time 2, the final payoff is determined. Here, the borrower pays VLender ( , ,D  T) back to the lender, and 
the payoff of the borrower is S ( , T) VLender ( , ,D  T). We assume that the lender and borrower have limited 
liability.  
Now, at time 1, we assume that the lender can somehow perceive the following situation. Contrary to the 
borrower about the contract promised at time 0. Here, the financial intermediary may consider to protect his 
assets or avoid the undesired situation in order for the borrower not to take such a risky project, as a result the 
lender may finally decide to propose debt concession to the borrower. Thus, the stakeholders in a financial 
contract are the lender and borrower. 
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3. Borrower s Risk Incentive and Payoff 
In general, the shareholders of a levered firm will behave so as to maximize the value of their shares since 
 do not necessarily coincide with firm value maximization when, in particular, the 
company is levered. Thus, we are to seek the optimal risk. We denote the profit of the borrower at maturity 
time T by 
).,,(),,( TDvTDVBorrower   (2) 
fit does not become negative even if default occurs. On the other hand, the 
profit for the borrower becomes 0 if the asset value falls below L only once before time T, because a knock-out 
condition that considers the fluctuation of assets before maturity is included. Therefore, the payoff structure of 
),,( TDv  implies a long position for the down-out call-type knock-out option, for which the assets of the 
project are considered as the underlying assets and the loan payment is considered as the strike price. 
According to Chesney and Gibson-Asner (2001), ),,( TDv  can be expressed as follows: 
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and )(  is the cumulative probability density function of the standard normal distribution. Then, the optimal 
risk *Borrower L where 
.0|),,(
Bo rro wer
TDVBorrower   (4) 
The solution to (4) is found by numerical computations because of the absence of a known closed-form 
solution. 
There has been some discussion on how to formulate default boundaries. Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) 
consider the default boundary as a constant that does not depend on time. On the other hand, Black and Cox 
(1976) and Briys and de Varenne (1997) assume it is an increasing function that varies with the interest 
payment and with the ratio of the loan collected at the default time. In this study, we assume that the default 
boundary does not depend on time and is constant. 
4.  
If a lender also has a risk incentive under some circumstances, he may make it difficult to carry out efficient 
debt renegotiation. Thus, when either party selects a risky project instead of a safe project, inefficiencies in 
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resource allocation develop. In particular, when the lender could predict the risk incentive of the borrower he 
may impose to require more additional amount to be paid, then the borrower will refrain from investing in the 
risky project.  
The possible loan collected by the lender at time T, VLender ( , ,D T) S 
( , T) minus the profit of the borrower, in other words, 
.
otherwise,
)(min],,min[
),,(),(),,(
L
LSDSTDvTSTDV TtTLender  (5) 
At this time, in the case of first step of (5), the assets of the project are available to repay the loan ( DST ), 
the lender can collect the whole amount of the promised loan. On the other hand, when DST default occurs 
and the lender receives the asset value. In the case that the asset value falls below L only once before time T, 
the lender will perceive the situation, the project is immediately suspended, the contract between the lender and 
borrower is terminated, and the lender collects the asset, which has a value L. According to Miyake and Inoue 
lue S ( , T) at maturity time T can be expressed in terms of a boundary L as 
follows: 
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To find an approximate value of *Lender, for example, under the assumption stated before, we let  
.|),,( max DTDV Len d erLender   (7) 
Summarizing the payoff for the lender and borrower, the following table is obtained. 
Table 1. Payoff of lender and borrower 
Payoff of borrower  ),,( TDv  
Payoff of lender  ),,(),( TDvTS  
Total  ),( TS  
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5. Safe and Risky Projects 
We assume two different types of project, a safe project S with risk S and a risky project R with risk R, 
respectively. Here, S is assumed equal to the risk *Lender obtained by (7) 
and R is assumed equal to the risk *Borrower obtained by (4  
** Risk
Project
Risk
Project
BorrowerRLenderS
RS
  
Therefore, the relation of the risk of projects S and R is R > S. When a borrower carries out project S under 
such an assumption, then the lender can collect the whole of the promised loan, as a result it becomes the 
optimal policy for the lender to carry out project S. On the other hand, if the borrower thinks from his 
standpoint, the profit of the borrower when selecting project S would be lower than the profit when selecting 
project R. The relation is, 
).,,(),,( TDVTDV SBorrowerRBorrower   (8) 
Therefore, the borrower may have an incentive to select the risky project R to maximize his gain, contrary to 
R 
becomes greater. Thus, the gain of the lender may be adversely affected and the risk-shifting incentive problem 
comes into existence between the lender and the borrower. 
However, if the lender is sensible of the situation and predicts the risk incentive of the borrower carrying out 
project R in advance, he will insist on a new loan D* satisfying 
.|),,( * DTDV DDRLender   (9) 
Thus, with VLender ( R, ,*D T) = ,D from (9) the profit of the borrower becomes 
.),(),,( * DTSTDV RRBorrower   (10) 
Therefore, the difference between the gain of the borrower with selecting project S and that of the borrower 
with selecting project R under the new loan D* stipulated by the lender becomes 
.),(),(),,(),,( ** TSTSTDVTDV RSRBorrowerSBorrower  (11) 
S ( , T) in (6) involves the default boundary; thus, S ( , T) is a decreasing function of . 
S and R is S ( S, T) > S ( R, T). 
Therefore, the difference in (11) is positive and considered agency cost which arises from the risk incentive 
problem being raised between both parties. Finally, if the difference of the optimal risk between both parties 
becomes large, the agency cost obtained by (11) increases. The difference is an agency cost that the borrower 
must bear to pay.  
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6. Possible Ways to Mitigate Risk Incentive 
In this section, several ways to mitigate risk incentive problem are discussed by option theory approach. 
There are several ways to mitigate or improve the situation. For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976), Green 
(2001) and Chiesa (1992) argue that debt with warrants or convertible debt can realign the incentives of both 
parties. Smith and Warner (1979) and Kalay (1982) mention the role of the provisions of contracts. Others 
including Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) point out that debt renegotiation often cannot be agreed on owing to 
conflicts among multiple creditors when the borrowing firm has a number of different creditors. Ziegler (2004) 
points out that providing an additional asset for security is an effective way of reducing the incentive problem 
in terms of more efficient resource allocation.  
 
(i) Debt Concession 
The risk-shifting incentive problem is avoidable as long as the borrower chooses a safe project even though 
the borrower is a levered firm. When the borrower is a levered firm or has unhealthy assets, the lender would 
agree on debt concession occasionally not so as to generate a risk incentive for the borrower. This implies that 
often required to direct his attention to the borrower and help the latter to meet the needs of social efficiency. 
We note if the lender has some responsibility to help the borrower somehow, as in the event we just mentioned, 
it is often observed that public funds are injected into the lending bank. In particular, mega banks ask the 
government  the use of  public funds to make up the amount of debt concession. 
As another case, if the gain of risk free assets falls below the face value of the debt in lending bank, the bank 
would not agree on debt concession, but rather he has incentive to maintain the initial contract promised. We 
note, as a result, that the debt concession is not implemented and the borrowing firm may select a risky project, 
and hence the financial intermediary may have a difficulty to collect the loan to the borrowing firm. Isagawa 
(2006) uses analytical way to show debt concession of lender might be an effective way of reducing incentive 
problems in terms of efficient resource allocation. But we can discuss and examine this problem in a 
framework of option pricing theory with some boundary condition, showing numerical examples. 
 
(ii) Convertible Bond 
Since both the optimal risks obtained by (4) and (7) are different, it becomes the cause that the risk incentive 
the more additional amount. Therefore the creditor must bear agency cost as shown by (11).  
First, the financing by issue of new shares is considered as a method to evade agency cost of (11). Note that 
since the final asset value with project S is higher than that with project R, the shareholder can receive a 
constant proportion of the final asset value obtained by (6), choosing project S 
intention. Therefore, the risk incentive problem may not occur between both parties. However, if the existing 
shareholder (the founder) does not want to face the situation where he is entitled to a smaller proportion of the 
assets, because it results in the weakening of his right of management, financing by issue of new shares is not 
desirable. For such a situation, the financing with convertible bond is effective as a method to improve the risk 
incentive problem without making the shareholding ratio of existing shareholder decrease. Here, the 
convertible bond (CB) is interpreted the bond that is issued as a corporate bond at the start and subsequently 
can be converted into shares from the corporate bond by the conversion claims of CB holder. Therefore, the 
feature of convertible bond seems to be characterized somewhere between financing with shares and financing 
with bond. 
  Focusing on the shareholding ratio after converting, conditions of (12) which can prevent the dilution of 
equity ownership and managerial control can evade agency cost. 
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where = n / (1 + n) is the shareholding ratio of the CB holder after converting with total number of shares by 
conversion n ( 0). 
If  is set in the relation in (12
intention. But, since the CB holder does not convert into shares when the project S is chosen, the shareholder 
can evade agency cost without decreasing shareholding ratio of his own. Thus, the shareholder can give the 
creditor the signal of choosing the safe project S by appropriately designing the shareholding ratio after 
converting. Fi
creditor demands falls. 
If the convertible bond is issued according to conditions of (12), it turns out that an agency cost is evaded 
completely as shown in numerical result. 
In order to completely remove agency cost, the cost for which the shareholder bears is limited as well, as 
compared with the security or limited dividend provision for which the gains of the creditor are compensated in 
full. 
 
(iii) Additional Asset Used as Security 
The effect of a second additional asset as security on the risk incentive for the lender and the borrower is 
examined through option pricing theory. The existence of this security has the following advantages for the 
both parties. From the 
case of bankruptcy, thus allowing him to recover more of the capital. Moreover, in the extreme case that the 
-shifting incentive disappears and the 
security reduces the difference between the risks of different projects, as desired by the lender and borrower, 
 
Through option pricing theory, it is observed that a security can be an effective way of reducing the 
incentive problem and t  
 
(iv) Limited Dividend Provision 
It is found that without dividend constraint there is a difference of the gains of the both parties for projects S 
and R, in particular, the difference is noticeable when the redemption amount is optimal. However, when the 
dividend is preserved the circumstance is different from that of unlimited dividend. The gains of both parties 
for a safe project S and a risky project R are compared under constraint on dividend so that the creditor does not 
lose much gain even when risky project was selected.  
7. Concluding Remarks 
relat
It will be recognized at times from 
this study that a lender s risk incentive often hinders the efficient debt renegotiation.  
In relation to this, we discussed several possible ways to mitigate risk incentive problems, each of which has 
its own nature, so that the way to use depends on its situation, and numerical examples can be showed with 
option pricing theory. In order to proceed with the analysis we used a knock-
payoff so that the optimal volatility level of projects becomes finite. Thus, the standard Black-Scholes 
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evaluation model is not sufficient to be used since when volatility is sensitive to asset values, borrowers are 
supposed to always select infinite-volatility projects. 
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